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The Problem of Tax Competition
From its beginnings late in the 19th century, the modem state has been
financed primarily by progressive income taxation. The income tax differs
from other forms of taxation (such as consumption or social security taxes) in
that in theory it includes income from capital in the tax base, even if it is saved
and not consumed. Because the rich save more than the poor, a tax that
includes income from capital in its base is more progressive (taxes the rich
more heavily) than a tax that excludes income from capital (e.g., a
consumption tax or a payroll tax). However, the ability to tax saved income
from capital (i.e., income not vulnerable to consumption taxes) is impaired if
the capital can be shifted overseas to jurisdictions where it escapes taxation.
Two recent developments have dramatically augmented the ability of both
individuals and corporations to earn income overseas free of income taxation:
The effective end of withholding taxation by developed countries, and the rise
of production tax havens in developing countries. 1 Since the U.S. abolished its
withholding tax on interest paid to foreigners in 1984, no major capital
importing country has been able to impose such a tax for fear of driving
mobile capital elsewhere (or increasing the cost of capital for domestic
borrowers, including the government itself). 2 The result is that individuals can
generally earn investment income free of host country taxation in any of the
world's major economies. 3 Moreover, even developed countries find it
exceedingly difficult to effectively collect the tax on the foreign income of
their individual residents in the absence of withholding taxes imposed by host
countries, because the investments can be made through tax havens with
strong bank secrecy laws. 4 Developing countries, with much weaker tax
administrations, find this task almost impossible. Thus, cross-border
investment income can largely be earned free of either host or home country
taxation. 5
For example, consider a wealthy Mexican who wishes to earn tax-free interest
income from investing in the bonds of an American corporation. All he needs

4

Reuven S. Avi-Y onah, Globalization, Tax Competition and the Fiscal Crisis of the
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Vito Tanzi, Taxation in an Integrating World (1995); Edward H. Gardner, Taxes on
Capital Income: A Survey, in George Kopits (ed.), Tax Harmonization in the European
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Flight from Latin America, University of Miami Inter-American Law Review 20:321
(1989).

117

Avi-Yonah
to do is set up, for a nominal fee, a Cayman Islands corporation to hold the
bonds. The interest payments are then made to the Caymans corporation
without any U.S. tax withheld under the so-called "portfolio interest
exemption." (Internal Revenue Code section 871 (h)). The individual does not
report the income to the Mexican tax authorities, and they have no way of
knowing that the Caymans corporation is effectively an "incorporated
pocketbook" of the Mexican resident. Nor is the exchange of information
provisions of the U.S.-Mexico tax treaty of any help, because the IRS has no
way of knowing that the recipient of the interest payments is controlled by a
Mexican resident and therefore cannot report this to the Mexican authorities.
As a result, the income is earned completely free of tax (the Caymans, of
course, impose no income taxes of their own).
When we switch our attention from passive to productive investment, a
similar threat to the taxing capacity of both home and host jurisdictions
emerges. In the last decade, competition for inbound investment has led an
increasing number of countries (103, as of 1998) to offer tax holidays
specifically geared to foreign corporate investors. 6 Given the relative ease
with which an integrated multinational can shift production facilities in
response to tax rates, such "production tax havens" enable multinationals to
derive most of their income abroad free of host country taxation. 7 Moreover,
most developed countries (including the U.S.) do not dare impose current
taxation (or sometimes any taxation) on the foreign source business income of
their resident multinationals, for fear of reducing the competitiveness of those
multinationals against multinationals of other countries. 8 If they did, new
multinationals could be set up as residents of jurisdictions that do not tax such
foreign source income. 9 Thus, business income can also be earned abroad
largely free of either host or home country taxation.
For example: Intel Corporation, a top 10 multinational, has operations in more
than 30 countries around the globe. The company states that "[a]n Intel chip
developed at a design center in Oregon, might be manufactured at a wafer
fabrication facility in Ireland, packaged and tested in Malaysia, and then sold

6

7

8
9

Raymond Vernon, In the Hurricane's Eye (1998); United Nations, World Investment
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James R. Hines, Jr., & Eric M. Rice, Fiscal Paradise: Foreign Tax Havens and
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James R. Hines, Jr. The Flight Paths of Migratory Corporations, Journal Of
Accounting, Auditing and Finance 6:447 (1991).
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to a customer in Australia. Another chip might be designed in Japan,
fabricated in Israel, packaged and tested in Arizona, and sold in China." 10
Specifically, outside the United States, Intel has major manufacturing
facilities in Puerto Rico, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Ireland, and
Israel. ll Thus, outside the United States, all oflntel 's manufacturing facilities
are located in countries granting tax holidays. Nor does Intel pay current U.S.
tax on its income from those foreign operations, because under U.S. law,
active income earned by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. multinationals is not
taxed until it is repatriated in the form of dividends, which Intel can delay for
many years. 12 Thus, the effective tax rate on Intel's foreign source income is
far below the nominal U.S. corporate rate of 35%.
If income from capital can escape the income tax net, the tax becomes in
effect a tax on labor. Several empirical studies have in fact suggested that in
some developed jurisdictions the effective tax rate on income from capital
approaches zero, and tax rates on capital have tended to go down sharply since
the early 1980s (when exchange controls were relaxed). 13 As a result,
countries that used to rely on the revenues from the income tax are forced to
increase relatively regressive taxes. The two fastest growing taxes in OECD
Member countries in recent years have been consumption taxes (from 12% of
total revenues in 1965 to 18% in 1995) and payroll taxes (from 19% to 2 7%),
both of which are more regressive than the income tax. 14 Over the same
period, the personal and corporate income taxes have not grown as a
percentage of total revenues (the personal income tax accounted for 26% of
total revenues in 1965 and 27% in 1995, while the figures for the corporate
income tax are 9% and 8% respectively). 15 The total tax revenue as a
percentage of GDP in developed countries went up sharply during the same
period (from an average of 28% in 1965 to almost 40% in 1994), and this
increase is largely accounted for by the rise of consumption and payroll
taxes. 16 Moreover, there is evidence that as the degree of openness of an
economy in OECD Member countries increases, taxes on capital tend to go
down while taxes on labor go up (the income tax is imposed on both capital
and labor, so that its stability may mask this trend). 17
10
11

12
13
14

15
16
17

Intel (1998), www.intel.com/inteVintelis/sites.htm.
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Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Taxation of Electronic Commerce, Tax Law
Review 52:507 (1997).
Jeffrey Owens and Jacques Sasseville, Emerging Issues in Tax Reform (1997); Dani
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Jeffrey Owens and Jacques Sasseville, Emerging Issues in Tax Reform ( 1997).
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World Bank, Tax Policy Handbook (1994).
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The same trends can be observed in developing countries as well. In nonO ECD Member countries (outside the Middle East) total government
revenues as a share of GDP rose from an average of 18.8% in 1975-80 to
20.1 % in 1986-92. 18 This growth was financed primarily by the growth of
revenues from the VAT in the same period (from 25.5% of total revenues to
31.8%). At the same time, revenues from both the individual and the corporate
income tax were flat or declined. 19
A recent study by Keen and Simone (2004) illustrates both the extent of this
problem and its impact on developing countries. Keen and Simone show that
from 1990 to 2001 corporate tax rates have declined in both developed and
developing countries. However, while in developed countries this decline in
the rates was matched by a broadening of the tax base, so that no decline in
revenues can be observed, 20 in developing countries the same period
witnessed a decline of corporate tax revenues by about 20 percent on average.
This decline is particularly important in light of the larger share of tax
revenues produced by the corporate tax in developing countries (average
17 percent, as opposed to 7 percent for developed countries). Keen and
Simone (2004) attribute most of this decline to the spread of targeted tax
incentives for MNEs. From 1990 to 2001 the percent of developing countries
granting tax holidays to MNEs grew from 45% to 58%, and similar trends can
be seen for tax breaks for exporters (32% to 45%), reduced corporate rates for
MNEs (40% to 60%), and free trade zones (17.5% to 45%). These figures are
particularly important because a companion paper by Altshuler and Gruber!
(2004) shows that the evolution of country effective tax rates in the period
between 1992 and 1998 seems to have been driven by tax competition, and
that US manufacturers are becoming increasingly important in determining
location of their investments.
1. Tax Competition and Developing Countries

The drawbacks of tax competition for developed countries are relatively clear,
because such countries have an elaborate social insurance safety net that
requires a high level of government expenditure and that is threatened by tax
competition. 21 But how does tax competition affect developing countries?
First, it should be pointed out that developing countries need the revenues at
least as much as developed countries do, if not more. A common

18
19

20
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World Bank, Tax Policy Handbook (1994).
World Bank (1994).
Rachel Griffith and Alexander Klemm, What Has Been the Tax Competition
Experience of the Last 20 Years, 34 Tax Notes Int'l 1299 (2004).
Willi Leibfritz et al., Ageing Populations, Pension Systems and Government Budgets,
OECD Economics Department Working Paper 156 (1995).
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misperception is that only OECD Member countries are confronted by a fiscal
crisis as a result of the increasing numbers of elderly people in the population.
In fact, the increase in dependency ratios (the ratio of the elderly to the
working population) is expected to take place in other geographic areas as
well, as fertility rates go down and health care improves. 22 Outside the OECD
and the transition economies, the dependency ratio starts in the single digits
in the 1990s, but rises to just below 30% by 2100. 23 Moreover, while outside
the OECD and the transition economies direct spending on social insurance is
much lower, other forms of government spending (e.g., government
employment) effectively fulfill a social insurance role. In Latin America, for
example, direct government spending on social insurance is much lower than
indirect spending through government employment and procurement
programs. 24
Moreover, it seems strange to argue that developing countries need tax
revenues less than developed countries because they have less developed
social insurance programs. If one accepts the normative case for social
insurance, it applies to developing countries with even greater force because
of widespread poverty, which means that losing a job can have much direr
consequences. 25 But the need for revenues in developing countries goes far
beyond social insurance. In some developing countries revenues are needed to
ensure the very survival of organized government, as the Russian experience
demonstrates. 26 In other, more stable developing countries revenues are
needed primarily to provide for adequate education (investment in human
capital), which many regard as the key to promoting development. 27 For
example, the UN has estimated that for only $30-$40 billion, all people in the
world can obtain basic social services (such as elementary education). 28 Given
current trends in foreign aid, most of these funds have to come from
developing country governments. 29
Second, the standard advice by economists to small open economies is that
they should refrain from taxing foreign investors, because such investors
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cannot be made to bear the burden of any tax imposed by the capital importing
country. 30 Therefore, the tax will necessarily be shifted to less mobile factors
in the host country, such as labor and/or land, and it is more efficient to tax
those factors directly. But while this argument seems quite valid as applied to
portfolio investment, it seems less valid in regard to FDI, for two reasons.
First, the standard advice does not apply if a foreign tax credit is available in
the home country of the investor, which frequently would be the case for
FDI. 31 Second, the standard advice assumes that the host country is small.
However, an extensive literature on multinationals suggests that typically they
exist in order to earn economic rents. 32 In that case, the host country is no
longer "small" in the economic sense. That is, there is a reason for the investor
to be there and not elsewhere. Therefore, any tax imposed on such rents (as
long as it is below 100%) will not necessarily drive the investor to leave even
if it is unable to shift the burden of the tax to labor or landowners.
This argument clearly holds in the case of rents that are linked to a specific
location, such as natural resources or a large market. But what if the rent can
be earned in a large number of potential locations?33 In this case, the host
country will not be able to tax the rent if the multinational can credibly
threaten to go elsewhere, although once the investment has been made the rent
can be taxed. This situation, which is probably the most common, 34 would
require coordinated action to enable all host countries to tax the rent earned
within their borders. Some possibilities for such action are described below.
This relates to the final argument, which is that host countries need to offer
tax incentives to be competitive. An extensive literature has demonstrated that
taxes do in fact play a crucial role in determining investment location
decisions. 35 But all of these studies emphasize that the tax incentives are
crucial given the availability of such incentives elsewhere. 36 Thus, it can be
argued that given the need for tax revenues, developing countries would in
30
31

32
33
34
35
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Assaf Razin and Efraim Sadka, International Tax Competition And Gains from Tax
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general prefer to refrain from granting tax incentives, if only they could be
assured that no other developing country would be able to grant such
incentives. 37
Thus, restricting the ability of developing countries to compete in granting tax
incentives does not truly restrict their autonomy or counter their interests.
That is the case whenever they grant the incentive only for fear of competition
from other developing countries, and would not have granted it but for such
fear. Whenever competition from other countries drives the tax incentive,
eliminating the competition does not hurt the developing country, and may aid
its revenue raising efforts (assuming it can attract investment on other
grounds, which is typically the case). Moreover, under the proposals
described below, developing countries remain free to lower their tax rates
generally (as opposed to granting specific tax relief aimed at foreign
investors).
Two additional points need to be made from a developing country perspective.
The first concerns the question of tax incidence. Since the tax competition that
is most relevant to developing countries concerns the corporate income tax, it
is important to attempt to assess the incidence of that tax in evaluating the
effects of collecting it on the welfare of the developing country.
Unfortunately, after decades of analysis, no consensus exists on the incidence
of the corporate tax. While the older studies have tended to conclude that the
tax is borne by shareholders or by all capital providers, more recent studies
have suggested that the tax is borne to a significant extent by consumers or by
labor. 38 Another possibility is that the tax on established corporations was
borne by those who were shareholders at the time the tax was imposed or
increased, because thereafter it is capitalized into the price of the shares. 39 It
is unlikely that this debate will be decided any time soon (in fact, the
incidence may be shifting over time, especially as globalization may enable
corporations to shift more of the tax burden to labor). However, from the
perspective of a developing country deciding whether to collect taxes from a
multinational, three out of the four possible alternatives for incidence (current
shareholders or capital providers, old shareholders, and consumers) are
largely the residents of other jurisdictions, and therefore from a national
welfare perspective the developing country gains by collecting the tax. And
even if some of the tax is shifted to labor in the developing country, it can be
argued that as a matter of tax administration it is more efficient (as well as

37
38
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more politically acceptable) to collect the tax from the multinational than to
attempt to collect it from the workers.
Finally, it should be noted that a developing country may want to collect taxes
from multinationals even if in general it believes that the private sector is
more efficient in using the resources than the public sector. That is because in
the case of a foreign multinational, the taxes that the developing country fails
to collect may indeed be used by the private sector, but in another jurisdiction,
and therefore not benefit the developing country. One possible solution, which
is in fact employed by developing countries, is to refrain from taxing
multinationals while they re-invest domestically, but tax them upon
remittance of the profits abroad. However, such taxation of dividends and
other forms of remittance is subject to the same tax competition problem that
we discussed above. Thus, it would appear that overcoming the tax
competition problem is in most cases in the interest of developing countries,
and the question remains how to do so in the face of the collective action
problem described above.
2. The OECD and Tax Competition
The tax competition problem is thus essentially a problem of coordination and
trust. Each jurisdiction would prefer to tax investors from abroad to gain the
revenue, but is afraid that by doing so it would drive the investors to other
jurisdictions that do not tax them. If there was a way to coordinate actions
among the relevant jurisdictions, they all could gain added revenues without
running the risk of losing the investment.
A good illustration of how this dynamic works is the history of German
taxation of interest income. In 1988, Germany introduced a 10%
withholding tax on interest paid to bank depositors, but had to abolish it
within a few months because of the magnitude of capital flight to
Luxembourg. In 1991, the German Federal Constitutional Court held that
withholding taxes on wages but not on interest violated the constitutional
right to equality. The government thereupon reintroduced the withholding
tax on interest, but made it inapplicable to non-residents. 40 Non-residents
may, however, be Germans investing through Luxembourg bank accounts.
To cope with this problem, the Germans have led an EU effort to introduce
either exchange of information or a withholding tax on all interest payments
to EU residents. 41 This proposal was adopted as a directive after a prolonged
political fight, but it is still conditioned upon the cooperation of Switzerland

40
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LeifMuten, International Experience of How Taxes Influence the Movement of Private
Capital, Tax Notes International 8:743 (1994).
European Union, Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council Meeting on 1 December 1997
Concerning Taxation Policy, O.J. (C 2) I (1998).
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and upon the actual implementation of withholding taxes by Luxembourg,
Belgium and Austria. 42
Thus, the key to finding a solution to the tax competition problem is to attack
it on a broad multilateral basis, through an organization such as the OECD.
Under current conditions, the OECD is the natural choice for leading such
coordinated actions against tax competition, for three reasons. First, for
individual investors to earn decent returns on their capital without incurring
excessive risks, they need to invest in an OECD Member country. Tax havens
do not offer adequate investment opportunities, and developing countries are
generally considered too risky for portfolio investment (other than through
mutual funds, which do not offer tax avoidance opportunities). Thus, if all
OECD Members enforced taxation of portfolio investment, it could be subject
to tax without requiring cooperation from the tax havens.
Second, about 85% of the world's multinationals are headquartered in OECD
Member countries. This is likely to continue to be the case for a while,
because OECD Members offer stable corporate and securities law protection
to investors that is lacking in other countries. Thus, if all OECD Members
agreed on a coordinated basis to tax their multinationals currently on their
income from abroad, most of the problem of tax competition from direct
investment could be solved.
Third, the OECD has the required expertise (its model tax treaty is the global
standard) and has already started on the path of limiting tax competition. In
1998, it adopted a report entitled "Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging
Global Issue."43 This Report is somewhat limited, because it only addresses
tax competition for financial activities and services (as opposed to, e.g.,
Intel's manufacturing plants). It also does not address the taxation of
investment income. But it represents an extremely useful first step, and proof
that a consensus can be reached on the tax competition issue (Switzerland and
Luxembourg abstained, but did not dare veto the adoption of the Report by the
other 27 Members of the OECD).
The OECD makes a useful distinction between tax competition in the form of
generally applicable lower tax rates, and tax regimes designed to attract
foreign investors. This distinction is both normatively and pragmatically
sound: Restricting tax competition should not and cannot mean that voters in
democratic countries lose their right to determine the size of the public sector
through general tax increases or reductions. But it does mean that countries
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Sibren Cnossen, Reform and Coordination of Corporation Taxes in the European
Union: An Alternative Agenda, 34 Tax Notes Int'! 1327 (2004).
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Harmful Tax Competition:
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should not provide windfalls for foreign investors at the expense of the ability
of other countries to provide those public services their residents desire. Such
limitations are particularly appropriate because those foreign investors
themselves often reside in countries providing a high level of services, and yet
refuse to pay the tax price that providing such services entails.
However, relying on the OECD to restrict tax competition suffers from three
significant drawbacks. First, the OECD only has 30 Members, and it is not
clear that it can effectively enforce its anti-tax competition rules on nonMember countries. For example, solutions that rely on where the parents of
MNEs are located assume that no significant growth in MNEs will take place
outside the OECD, and solutions that rely on the OECD as the market assume
no significant markets outside the OECD. Either assumption may become
wrong, and when that happens solutions that rely on OECD enforcement will
lose their effectiveness unless those emerging markets were to join the OECD.
While several developing countries have joined the OECD recently (e.g.,
South Korea and Mexico), it is hard to imagine China or India doing so in the
near future.
Second, relying on the OECD to implement solutions to the tax competition
problem, even if those solutions are tailored to benefit developing countries,
may not be acceptable to those countries. Even though the OECD has made a
huge effort to include non-OECD Members in the tax competition project, it
is still identified as the rich countries' club. Thus, it is hard to believe that
developing countries will be able to shed their suspicions that the OECD will
not act in their interests even if it can actually be made to do so. In fact, the
effort by the OECD to develop a multilateral agreement on investments (MAI)
foundered precisely because developing countries and left-leaning nongovernmental organizations coordinated a campaign against it as representing
the interests of the rich countries and "their" MNEs.
Third, the OECD effort is limited so far to geographically mobile financial
services, and excludes real investments, although these constitute a significant
part of the problem. In addition, even for the areas it does cover, the OECD
has only the power to persuade, not to adjudicate. This has led commentators
to look for an alternative, and the obvious candidate, especially after the FSC
case, is the WTO.
3. The WTO and Tax Competition

3.1. The WTO Rules

There are two articles of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
that bear directly on taxation. Article III of the GATT provides that "internal
taxes [ ... ] should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to
126
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afford protection to domestic production." Because of the reference to
products, this provision has generally been understood as referring only to
indirect taxes (i.e., excise taxes or consumption taxes such as the VAT).
However, even if the article is interpreted as referring to direct taxes as well,
it seems unlikely that the income tax in particular can be used as an instrument
for protecting domestic production because of the difficulty of designing
income tax provisions that will apply only to foreign production.
Article XVI of the GATT provides in general for notification procedures in the
case of any "subsidy [... ] which operates directly or indirectly to increase
exports of any product from, or to reduce imports of any product into, [a
contracting party's] territory." In addition, the article expressly prohibits the
use of any subsidy "on the export of any product[ ... ] which subsidy results
in the sale of such product for export at a price lower than the comparable
price charged for the like product to buyers in the domestic market." A note
clarifies that the exemption of an exported product from taxes borne by the
like product when destined for domestic consumption (such as zero rating
exports for VAT) "shall not be deemed to be a subsidy."
Article XVI was significantly expanded by the Subsidies Code included in
the 1994 version of the GATT. The Subsidies Code defines "subsidy" as
including cases where "government revenue that is otherwise due is
foregone or not collected." To be actionable under the GATT, a subsidy must
be "specific to an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or
industries." In addition, a specific subsidy is prohibited only if it is
"contingent, in law or in fact ... upon export performance" or "upon the use
of domestic over imported goods." Annex I to the Subsidies Code includes
an "illustrative list of export subsidies" which includes "[t]he full or partial
exemption remission, or deferral specifically related to exports of direct
taxes [ ... ] paid or payable by industrial or commercial enterprises."
However, a footnote clarifies that this language "is not intended to limit a
Member from taking measures to avoid the double taxation of foreign source
income earned by its enterprises."
Importantly, the Subsidies Code applies only to goods, not to services.
Services are addressed in the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS). Because services frequently involve FDI, in this case the line
between trade and investment is particularly blurred. Therefore, the United
States inserted provisions in the GATS that prevent it from overriding
domestic tax legislation and income tax treaties applicable to FDI. In
particular, the provision of national treatment for service providers can be
avoided if "the difference in treatment is aimed at ensuring the equitable and
effective imposition or collection of direct taxes." In addition, MFN treatment
can be avoided if the difference in treatment follows from a tax treaty. The
GATS does not include a provision on subsidies.
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3.2. Application to Tax Havens
In previous work, 44 I have identified three types of tax havens: (I) "production
tax havens", in which there is a specific tax holiday or other type of tax benefit
designed to attract foreign investors to set up production facilities in a host
country. (11) "Traditional tax havens", i.e., jurisdictions with little or no
income tax that seek to attract foreign investors and financial service
providers through the promise of no taxation and bank secrecy. (iii)
"Headquarters tax havens", i.e., regimes designed to attract multinational
enterprises to locate their headquarters in a jurisdiction by promising no
taxation (or no current taxation) of income derived from foreign subsidiaries.
How do the GATT rules previously described apply to these three types of tax
haven? The clearest application is in the case of production tax havens. These
regimes are invariably "ring fenced", i.e., they are designed to foster exports
and therefore are separated from the domestic economy (and sometimes also
not available to domestic investors). The regimes are ring fenced precisely
because they are set up by countries with a real domestic tax base that do not
wish to see that base eroded by the tax concessions granted within the
preferential regimes. The EU and OECD Reports on harmful tax competition
cite dozens of such regimes, even though they limit themselves only to
regimes of Member countries and (in the case of the OECD) exclude "real"
investments (i.e., manufacturing).
There seems to be little doubt that such production tax havens constitute
prohibited export subsidies under the GATT. They invariably involve
foregone revenue, are specific to certain taxpayers (in fact they are frequently
negotiated deals), and are "in fact" contingent on export performance because
the products or services they involve cannot be targeted at the domestic
market. The exception would be a regime for foreign investors that is targeted
mainly at the domestic market, but such regimes are dwindling in importance
as large developing countries realize that if MNEs need to access their
domestic market, it is generally not necessary to offer tax reductions to induce
them to come because they would need proximity to the market in any case.
The two other types of tax havens, traditional tax havens and headquarters tax
havens, are probably not in violation of WTO rules because they mostly offer
a subsidy to services and not goods (although if goods are defined to include
intangibles, a case could be made to include them). Fortunately, these types of
tax havens are the focus of the OECD efforts, so it would seem advisable for
the WTO to focus on production tax havens.
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4. Conclusion: Is the WTO the Best Forum to Deal
with Tax Competition?
From the perspectives described above, the WTO is a more attractive
candidate for "world tax organization". It has a much broader membership
than the OECD, and developing countries are much better represented (and
have real clout, as shown by the recent struggle over choosing the Director
General of WTO). Moreover, as explained above, the WTO rules already
cover and prohibit the form of tax competition that is most prevalent in
developing countries, namely granting targeted tax incentives to MNEs
engaged in the manufacture of goods. As long as the goods are primarily
intended for export (as would typically be the case for small developed
countries), such targeted incentives arguably constitute a prohibited export
subsidy. 45 Moreover, if the goods are primarily intended for the local market,
there is much less pressure of the developing countries to grant tax incentives
(see, e.g., Argentina, Brazil, and China, which are phasing them out).
But there are several serious objections to including tax matters in the
jurisdiction of the WTO. First, it has been argued that the WTO lacks
sufficient tax expertise. However, that problem can be remedied by hiring a
sufficient number of tax experts to sit on the WTO' s panels. In fact, as the
WTO has expanded its jurisdiction to non-tariff matters, its staff already
includes tax experts who also understand trade issues.
Robert Green has advanced a more serious objection arguing that the costs of
imposing the WTO's legalistic dispute-resolution mechanism outweigh any
benefits. 46 Green argues that the need for the WTO to resolve trade disputes
legalistically is based on two features that are typically lacking in the tax
context: retaliation and lack of transparency. Retaliation is a feature of
repeated prisoners' dilemma type games and ensures that players have an
incentive to cooperate. In an assurance (stag hunt) game, both players
cooperate if they can be assured of the other player's cooperation. In the first
case an organizational setting is needed to manage retaliatory strategies while
in the second it is needed to provide the information needed for the assurance
to exist.
However, in the context of tax competition it would seem that both retaliation
and lack of information are serious problems. For example, in the case of
portfolio investment the U.S. began a race to the bottom by abolishing its
withholding tax, and other countries responded (i.e., retaliated) by abolishing
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their own taxes. In the current situation no country dare re-impose its tax
without adequate assurance that other countries will follow. Similarly, for
direct investment, countries have adopted tax incentives or adopted deferral
and exemption rules for their resident MNEs in response to the actions of
other countries and fear changing such policies without assurance that others
will follow suit. Thus, whether these developments are characterized as
prisoners' dilemma or assurance games, they seem to present precisely the
kind of problem that only a multilateral organization with rule-making power
can effectively resolve.
However, Green also raises another objection to giving the WTO authority
over taxes which in practice is likely to be far more potent: the problem of
sovereignty. Countries are wary of giving up their sovereignty over tax
matters which lies at the heart of their ability to exercise national power. This
concern is particularly acute in the U.S. and almost led to the failure of the
entire Uruguay Round as the U.S. insisted at the last minute to exclude direct
taxes from the purview of the GATS. Green argues that if the WTO dispute
resolution mechanism were given authority over tax issues, this may lead to
widespread noncompliance especially given the perception that the WTO is
non-transparent and lacks democratic legitimacy.
Green may be wrong about this estimate, especially since the analysis above
has shown that the WTO already has jurisdiction on the most important form
of harmful tax competition, so that no further extension of its powers is
necessary. But even if Green is right and sovereignty poses a real problem,
there may be a solution to this as well. Under the GATT regime, all decisions
had to be reached by consensus, i.e., with the agreement of the party whose
regime is at stake. Under the WTO rules, on the other hand, all dispute
settlement rulings are binding unless there is a consensus not to implement
them, i.e., when even the complaining party agrees to refrain from action.
Perhaps the former rule is more appropriate for tax matters than the latter
because it gives the loser a veto if it feels that its sovereignty is truly at stake.
Similar rules exist for tax matters in both the EU and the OECD. But, as the
DISC case in the GATT and the adoption of the tax competition report by the
OECD show, a country will typically reserve its veto power only to those
cases in which the adverse result is truly perceived as a severe limit on its
sovereignty. In other cases, the stigma of disapproval is sufficient to ensure
cooperation.

In the final analysis, it may thus be necessary to set up a multilateral
organization with different rules than the WTO, but with similarly broad
membership. The UN is the obvious venue for setting up such an organization,
building on the important work of the League of Nations Fiscal Committee.
The Current Ad Hoc Group of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax
Matters should be upgraded to provide the basis for such an organization.
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To sum up: As a result of globalization and tax competition, tax rules can no
longer be set by countries acting unilaterally or by bilateral tax treaties. In a
world in which capital can move freely across national borders and
multinationals are free to choose among many investment locations, the
ability of any one country (or any two countries in cooperation) to tax (or
otherwise regulate) such capital is severely limited. Any such unilateral
attempt will be undercut by other countries, and will probably not be even
attempted in the name of preserving national competitiveness. Thus, a
multilateral solution is essential if the fundamental goals of taxation or other
regulation are to be preserved. Private market activities that span the globe
can only be regulated or taxed by organizations with a similar global reach.
This chapter has attempted to outline some of the ways in which such global
governance can be achieved in the area of capital income taxation. Achieving
this goal will not be easy, given the expected resistance of both private actors
eager to preserve their freedom from taxation and of governments concerned
about preserving their sovereign ability to set their own tax rules. But it is not
impossible. Moreover, since preserving the ability of developing nations to
tax income from capital is essential to the achievement of important policy
goals, it must be tried.
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